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The attempts, post-11 September 2001, to bring the Gulf states in on the side of 
the Westem-led ‘coalition against terrorism’, have focused general attention on 
the security dimension of relations between the West and states such as Saudi 
Arabia. The contributions which were hoped for ranged from the breaking off of 
diplomatic relations with the Taliban government (which the two states that had 
them, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, swiftly did), over diplomatic support for an 
anti-terrorism campaign, to choking off the flow of funds to suspect 
organisations, intelligence cooperation, and the use of military facilities. By 
the same token, those engaged in these attempts have become increasingly 
aware that there are limits to the demands they can make of these governments, 
and that such limitations are linked to popular and governmental feelings about 
other issues in regional politics, and to consequent questions of regime 
legitimacy and domestic stability. There can be no more appropriate time to 
rethink and revive the Political Dialogue between Europe and the GCC.
1. Key issues
Dissatisfaction with the content and effect of the dialogue between the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states and the European Union is of long standing. 
The discontent has varied on the two sides and over time -  but there has clearly 
been a perception that the sides were at times talking at, or past, rather than to, 
each other, and that key concerns of one side were not being addressed or even 
acknowledged by the other. Of course, economic interests on both sides are of 
central importance. But these are combined and in many instances intertwined 
with political and security issues. Hence the “political dialogue.”
For the GCC states’ leaderships, a key issue in this arena has long been 
regional security; in turn this is at least in part linked to concerns over the 
Palestine question, which itself has the potential to upset stability. For the 
European side, too, regional security in the Gulf is a high priority. At the same 
time, however, the EU also has concerns about questions of governance and 
human rights in its relations with third parties, a concern which is both a matter 
of principle and linked to the aim of fostering long-term domestic stability. 
Elsewhere, one of the present authors has made the case for a European policy 




























































































was argued that such a policy must be clearly set in a broader context:1 GGHR 
initiatives must, to have any credibility or effect, be part of a much broader 
dialogue which is genuinely mutual and encompasses GCC concerns. Leaving 
aside the economic aspects of the relationship, the Dialogue between the EU 
and the GCC should, then, be composed of three themes:
• good governance and human rights;
• cultural issues and understanding;
• security & international affairs.
European interlocutors -  whether at the collective or at the bilateral level -  
cannot hope to achieve a satisfactory dialogue on the first theme, unless the 
second and third are also developed. Both of these themes are of genuine 
importance for the GCC interlocutors, whether for reasons of principle and 
conviction, for practical political calculation, or as an indicator that their 
European counterparts tire prepared to deal with them as equals, and are taking 
their interests and concerns seriously.
This paper will deal with the third theme. The EU, and EU governments, 
cannot escape the need to address security issues and international affairs in 
their dialogue with the GCC states. First, covering those issues -  and in 
particular Gulf security and the Arab-Israeli dispute -  is a long-standing 
desideratum of these states. Second, apart from their intrinsic importance, they 
are also connected to the other interests of both sides (including European aims 
on GGHR). Third, this need has only been made more acute by the events of 11 
September 2001 and after. It is now Europe itself, as well as the US, that has 
been raising the security issue of fighting the Al-Qaida network. Popular 
reactions in much of the Arab and Muslim world, and reactions of the GCC 
governments themselves to attempts to bring them in as active members of an 
international coalition against Al-Qaida and the Taliban, have served to 
highlight more starkly than ever the long-standing imperative to address two 
key concerns of the GCC regimes.
• Palestine: (a) this has both Arab and Muslim resonances, and implications 
for regime legitimacy; (b) GCC regimes find it impossible to justify (to 
themselves and their populations) the contrast between the international 
treatment of Israeli transgressions of international law on the one hand, and
1 Gerd Nonneman, ‘Good Governance, Human Rights and the Case for Political Adaptation 
in the Gulf: Issues in the EU-GCC Dialogue’, RSC Policy Paper no. 01/03, Robert 




























































































those of Iraq and Afghanistan on the other; and (c) the US, the main actor 
against the latter two, is also seen as carrying the main responsibility for 
making possible the Israeli transgressions, through its supply of finance, 
arms and diplomatic support. That it ils at times also used as a political ‘alibi’ 
does not diminish the potency of this basic logic -  indeed it is so used only 
because of it.
• Gulf security: the concern for domestic and regional stability unites the 
interests of the EU and the GCC governments. Domestic security requires, 
among other things, that gradual political evolution is encouraged (as argued 
in a separate paper2); that the governments be seen to get results on issues of 
popular concern such as the Palestine question; and that they are, 
meanwhile, not perceived as overly reliant on US protection. The latter point 
links in to regional security dilemmas. First, Gulf security in the long run 
needs to be seen to be less explicitly dependent on a large US presence; and 
Gulf security can, in the long term, only be assured by bringing in all eight 
riparian states. Second, strong continuing fears among GCC leaders over 
Saddam Hussein’s regime, and a determination to see it contained, are 
mixed with severe concern over the suffering of the Iraqi population -  again 
because of the stark contrast with the case of Israel and the impact on 
popular opinion. Third, the potential destabilising impact for the GCC states 
of economic and/or political collapse in Yemen must be avoided.
In short, Gulf security -  a key interest of the EU -  is one of the GCC 
governments’ top concerns; there is an inescapable link between this and the 
Arab-Israeli theatre; and it is clear that the avoidance of a ‘failed state’ in 
Yemen is in everyone’s interest. Since these issues cannot be sidelined, 
therefore, it is necessary for European actors to formulate a position on them in 
their dialogue with the GCC governments: the latter will expect no less, and the 
context of the post-11 September campaign against terrorism has made it 
imperative. EU governments should therefore attempt to agree on a common 
position on these issues, based on an identification of common interests with the 
GCC states.
In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, there is clearly an immediate 
need to discuss the means to contain terrorist threats. Yet it is vital not to let this 
concern obscure the persistent and central importance of the issues identified 






























































































It is important to acknowledge from the start that there are significant 
limitations on the potential for European policy in this regard. These limitations 
come under five headings.
First, there are limitations to the available means, most strikingly in the 
military sector. This is true both in absolute terms, and in terms of the 
interoperability of European equipment.
Second, it is clear that the political will to commit military, economic, 
and political resources abroad is often lacking. In the case of the Middle East, 
there has been occasional but very inconsistent political investment; very 
considerable economic commitment of resources in the peace process; and 
relatively little else (with the exception of the British and French contribution to 
the US-led operations against Iraq since 1990).
Third, and part of the explanation for the above, EU members states 
harbour significantly divergent interests, often have differing interpretations of 
Middle Eastern events, and frequently, as a consequence, follow quite different 
policies. Especially where it concerns differences based on divergence of 
interests, harmonising policy is bound to be very difficult at best. These 
interests prominently include commercial considerations, but also calculations 
and preferences about the future European relationship with the United States.
The fourth limitation consists precisely of this: the US factor. On the one 
hand, successive US Administrations have expressed reservations about an 
independent European role in the Middle East; on the other, many European 
governments have been unwilling to pursue policies against American wishes -  
both out of a conviction that in the long run US involvement will remain 
crucial, and from a more general unwillingness to upset the wider international 
Euro-American axis in world politics.
Finally, and crucially, there are EU-level structural-institutional 
limitations that intertwine with, and in part underlie, the above. Easily the best 
analysis of this has been offered by Monar in his work on the institutional 
constraints on the EU’s MENA policy.3 He shows how the dualistic nature of 
the EU system with regard to foreign policy (the EC having competence for
3 Jorg Monar, ‘Institutional Constraints of the European Union’s Middle Eastern and North 
African Policy’, in Sven Behrendt & Christian-Peter Hanelt (eds.), Bound to Cooperate -  




























































































external economic relations, the CFSP for foreign and security policy), leaves 
its imprint on external representation, decision-making procedures, instalments 
and implementation -  as well as on democratic control. This, he argues, has had 
a three-fold impact on the EU’s MENA policy. First, the EU ‘is a clearing house 
of different interests rather than a unitary actor with more or less clearly defined 
objectives’. (Indeed, the Barcelona process flowed largely from the interests of 
southern member states, while members states have widely diverging levels of 
interest in the GCC). Second, there is ‘an in-built tilt towards the economic 
domain,’ since ‘CFSP is by far the weaker structure of the EU’s dual system of 
foreign affairs.’ Third, this dualism has created difficulties for the MENA 
partners in terms of transparency and predictability. In addition, Monar exposes 
serious problems of management, arising not least because the administration of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative (EMPI) has been shifted to the 
Commission without any new posts being created to cope with this. When it 
comes to the Gulf, of course, such understaffing has long been obvious, and it is 
not clear how the abolishing of the Gulf unit in 2001 will help. The dualism also 
exacerbates the institutional problem of financing initiatives, while, finally, 
causing problems in the conduct of negotiations. Monar concludes: ‘Its partners 
have to accept tha t... the Union has in-built limitations to its capacity to act and 
a considerable potential for blockages in the decision-making and policy- 
implementation process.’
None of the above, however, means that common positions on some 
issues are impossible, if common or reconcilable interests can be identified. Nor 
does it mean that a gradual further evolution towards greater coordination need 
be utopian. At the very least, it is important that the dynamics of domestic and 
regional politics in the Gulf are analysed in their own terms; that the interests 
and perceptions of GCC interlocutors are understood; and that attempts are 
made to perceive the extent to which European (collective or individual) 
interests can be served by a coordinated policy towards the Gulf and the wider 
Middle East, calibrated on the basis of that analysis. Awareness of the 
limitations, therefore, needs to be combined with a concerted search for 
commonalities and consensus.
European positions in the political dialogue with the GCC states need to 
be informed and at least in part determined by an analysis of the underlying 
dynamics of the theatres that will be discussed. Hence a summary analysis of 
that sort, in section II, will be at the heart of this paper. In section III, we 
analyse the view from the GCC. Finally, in section IV, we present the policy 




























































































II. ANALYSIS: GULF SECURITY, THE LINK WITH PALESTINE, 
AND TERRORISM
In approaching the issue of Gulf security, a clear distinction must always be 
made between short-term requirements and long-term vision. It is important to 
see the former in the context of the latter -  something which has been missing 
all too often. The main difference between the two turns on the dilemma posed 
by Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
1. A long-term basis for Gulf security
The nature of the Gulf system, and the need for securing the Gulf itself as a 
whole, are such that, in the long run, only a pan-Gulf security arrangement is 
likely to bring a satisfactory outcome. Because of their interlocking interests 
(both in common and in conflict), all the riparian states ultimately need to be 
involved. That this is currently unrealistic, as long as Iraq’s regime remains in 
place, does not obviate the need to see intermediate solutions in that long-term 
context. Within this pan-Gulf framework, two further conditions need to be 
fulfilled -  conditions that such a context in fact would make somewhat easier to 
fulfil. The first is that key security concerns of all states need to be addressed -  
including remaining border issues, especially surrounding Iraq’s access to the 
sea, and the Gulf islands issue between Iran and the UAE . For Iran, such 
concerns also include the perceived possible threat from outside forces in the 
Gulf -  in particular the US.
This leads us to the second condition: in the long term, US and other 
outside military presence in the region should become less prominent, and the 
collective security arrangement should come to rely relatively less on outside 
powers. There will always remain a role for outside powers -  indeed none of the 
GCC states would want to do without some Western security insurance. But the 
huge presence since 1990 has, itself, destabilising effects, both within the GCC 
countries (as highlighted during the US-British military campaign in 
Afghanistan from October 2001), and for relations between them and their two 
large neighbours. Looking beyond the current stand-off with Iraq, such a 
transformed security arrangement is not quite ‘pie in the sky’: on the one hand, 
Iran’s policy towards its GCC neighbours across the Gulf has become strikingly 
cooperative (see section 2 below); on the other, GCC states themselves have 
become increasingly warm towards Tehran, and are increasingly recognising the 
down-side of overly manifest security dependence on the US (see section III). 




























































































commitment and exposure in the Gulf, if alternative ways can be found to 
assure safe and predictably priced oil supplies.
Given historical, cultural, and ethnic factors, together with recent 
experience, a high degree of political and economic integration in the Gulf 
should not be expected -  let alone an expansion of the GCC. There is 
nevertheless
some basis on which to move beyond security cooperation and arms control to other 
measures of pragmatic collaboration. The states have common interests in the 
protection of the environment ....; the development of unified procedures for shipping 
in the Gulf ....; the pursuit of mutually-reinforcing policies on oil and gas production 
and pricing; and the resolution of border disputes between riparian states. Moreover, 
measures to enhance human and commercial exchange among [these] states .... can
4
all strengthen the trend towards cooperation.
The Kuwait crisis not only highlighted the necessity of stronger political and 
defence integration within the GCC and the need for reliable alliances outside 
the organisation, it also demonstrated the inevitability of bringing Iran into the 
Gulfs security equation. This became clearer than ever once the options of 
either relying on an Iraqi buffer or playing off Iran and Iraq against each other 
had been shown ineffective and/or foreclosed. Because of this, and in view of 
the overwhelming presence of Iran, as well as of the Iranians’ own perception of 
their role and interests, it would be both futile and counter-productive to 
maintain the fiction of Gulf security without some form of Iranian involvement. 
Given the Iranian leadership’s signals that, on the whole, it intends to play by 
the rules of the international community; given the already existing trade links; 
and given the coordination of oil policy that has already been in evidence, such 
Iranian involvement would likely be much less problematic than feared. It 
would, moreover, consolidate the pragmatic trend in that country. By the same 
token, there is an absolute need to address the key Iraqi concerns of 
redevelopment and security of access to the sea. We will return to the Iranian 
and Iraqi cases below.
In sum, a Gulf security regime with long-term viability must
• avoid visible over-reliance on US presence;
• acknowledge the importance and security interests of both Iraq and Iran;
• encompass all eight riparian states.
Tim Niblock, ‘The realms within which integrated communities could be fostered’, in 
Gerd Nonneman (ed.), The Middle East and Europe: The Search for Stability and 




























































































This means that the once mooted “6 + 2” arrangement -  referring to the GCC 
plus Syria and Egypt -  is not, on its own, desirable: it would accentuate the 
split in the Gulf. In any case, that idea never showed any vitality because of 
misgivings within the GCC states themselves. It is not wholly fanciful, 
however, to envisage a Gulf-8 security community, which additionally would 
establish a close link with Egypt and Syria, and in which Yemen, as the most 
populous state on the peninsula, and Turkey, as a regional power with important 
interests at stake, could be given observer or associate status. All of this could 
come under UN auspices, with external powers playing the role of guarantors 
within those. The inclusion of Iran in such a security community, while 
certainly not straightforward, would pose fewer problems than often assumed in 
the past. Indeed, the security cooperation being developed between Riyadh and 
Tehran in 2001 shows how far the two neighbours have come since the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Yet as long as there is no change in the Iraq regime, there 
is no chance of the GCC states accepting that country as a partner in such a 
scheme. Change in Iraq, therefore, is of the essence.
One element in this, as already indicated, should be an effort to create 
increasingly interlocking economic interests (although the limitations on, and 
difficulties facing economic integration in the Gulf are well recognised.5) On 
the military side, developments would obviously proceed very gradually. This 
would eventually have to involve collective, as opposed to bilateral, 
coordination; exchange of information (not least on exercises); joint training 
and exercises; an element of joint planning and procurement; and the 
establishment of some kind of joint brigade (as the GCC already has in 
embryonic form).
Apart from the necessity of change in Iraq, one wider regional factor has 
crucial relevance to such long-term plans: the Palestine question. It is true that 
the GCC states themselves have engaged in security cooperation as an issue 
distinct from the Arab-Israeli theatre. It would also be wrong to say that no 
progress can be made on solving any Gulf security issues unless the Arab-Israeli 
conflict is resolved. Yet there certainly is a degree of linkage, both in popular 
perceptions and in strategic facts. Arab and Iranian bitterness over the plight of 
Palestine continues to have an effect which can only be ignored at one’s peril. 
Even where some governments might put pragmatism before any sense of
5 See David Pike, ‘The Gulf: The Potential for Economic Cooperation’, in The Middle East 
and Europe, op. cit., pp. 79-83; and Gerd Nonneman, ‘The Gulf: Background 




























































































injustice, they are often constrained by the explosive potential of popular 
feelings on the subject. And even if in some quarters in the GCC states 
sympathy with the Palestinians diminished somewhat in 1990-91, the discussion 
on Gulf security needs to consider other Gulf constituencies as well where this 
has not been the case. The Al-Aqsa intifada of 2000-01, moreover, has raised 
anti-Israel (and indeed anti-US) feelings again throughout the region. The 
Palestine issue, therefore, affects a possible future Gulf security community 
because of (1) the role which potential outside guarantors are perceived to play 
in support of Israel; and (2) the unlikelihood that any Gulf state will accept any 
serious control of , or reduction in, its armaments as long as they live in the 
context of a continued Arab-Israeli arms race.
Clearly, bridging the gap between the legitimate short- and medium-term 
concerns and realities, and the long-term goal of a security community of sorts, 
will be difficult. Getting there may be facilitated by a flexibly constituted 
Conference for the Gulf, as proposed by Richard Dalton (currently Britain’s 
Ambassador to Libya) in a report for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
He suggests a conference could be convened under UN auspices and chaired by 
a representative of the UN Secretary-General. The conference “would then 
break down into working groups to deal with particular issues step by step, over 
a number of years. The conference would remain in session, but it would be in 
the working groups that the main work was done.” 6 The full participants would 
be the eight riparian states -  even though it is recognised that Iraq would present 
a problem. In addition, a category of observers is suggested which could include 
the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as the key neighbours: 
Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Turkey. As the various working groups would 
cover different themes and cover different combinations of countries, their 
composition would be flexible. In such a context, where the various inter­
related issues would be addressed at least in parallel, if not simultaneously, it 
could well be easier to arrive at compromises. Problems that one could imagine 
benefiting from this approach (and which otherwise might appear intractable) 
would be Iraq’s access to the Gulf; Iran’s regional security concerns clashing 
with the presence of foreign military personnel or assets on the territory of the 
GCC states; the financial questions relating to Iraq’s position vis-à-vis Iran, the 
GCC and the International community; the dispute over Abu Musa and the 
Tunbs; and arms control. In addition, the search for ways and means of 
increasing functional cooperation could be made part of the conference’s remit 
(mirroring, in part, the Arab-Israeli peace process) -  a worthwhile objective in
6 Richard Dalton, Winning Peace in the Gulf: A Long-Term View (London: Royal Institute 




























































































its own right but also conceivably facilitating compromise in other areas. This, 
as Dalton points out, is where the European Union might play a useful role, 
bringing in its experience in the field of functional cooperation. The Union and 
its member states might also be instrumental in bringing the whole proposal into 
the limelight, and lending it credibility.
2. Iran
In spite of (indeed, arguably because of) the political developments at home, 
Iran remains one of the key actors in the Gulf. As a prominent Saudi figure put 
it to one of the authors, ‘Iran’s revolution posed sort of a technical threat to our 
security that we managed to contain, but whether we will be able to deflect the 
power of Khatami’s movement this side of the Gulf remains to be seen. It is 
hard to decide which is more .... threatening, the export of its revolution or the 
power of Khatami’s reforms’.
2.1. The nature o f the Iranian regime
The evolution of Iran’s political system in the 90s, marked by some key 
constitutional reforms in 1989, which followed the end of the Iran-Iraq war and 
the death of the founder of the new republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, can be 
divided into two distinct periods: the pragmatist-reconstructionist Rafsanjani 
presidency (1989-1997); and the pragmatist-pluralist Khatami presidency. 
President Rafsanjani, a seasoned politician, close ally of Ayatollah Khomeini 
and a central figure in the Islamic revolutionary elite since the revolution itself, 
became Iran’s first executive president in 1989, winning 13.5 million out of the 
14.2 million votes cast in that year’s presidential poll. Despite the customary 
level of horse trading in appointments to senior posts, the make-up of 
Rafsanjani’s cabinet largely reflected his administration’s core objectives: 
reconstruction of the shattered country and reform of the economy and the 
bureaucracy. To this end, he assembled a team of largely Western-educated 
technocrats and social reformers. He set up what he himself dubbed ‘the cabinet 
for reconstruction’, with Khatami as one of its key social reformer members.7
By any measure then his agenda was a reformist one, albeit largely 
limited to the reform of the economy and creation of the right conditions for
7 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘Iran’s New Order: Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy 




























































































growth. His proposed reforms hinged on the introduction of sweeping market 
reforms, privatisation, and structural adjustment.
But in order to succeed, Rafsanjani needed the support of Ayatollah 
Khamenei as well as the Majlis. The Majlis was gradually won over as 
Rafsanjani slowly dropped his social reform agenda (including Khatami himself 
from his cabinet) in favour of practical measures which would move the 
economy towards the free market system. Support from the Majlis, however, 
had to be ‘engineered’, and a pro-economic reform majority from the ranks of 
the conservative and right-wing forces found. Thus, in the course of the early 
1990s Rafsanjani led a successful campaign against the so-called etatist and 
Islamic leftist and populist forces. Once in place, the conservatives supported 
most of the Rafsanjani administration’s economic programme. In this fashion, 
the conservative forces gained control of the Majlis, and were to keep it until the 
Sixth Majlis elections in February 2000.
The price for the Rafsanjani-conservative ‘understanding’ was the 
wholesale removal of political and social reforms from Rafsanjani’s reform 
agenda.8
The second period began rather unexpectedly and is marked by the 
stunning election victory of Hojjatoleslam Khatami in the presidential poll of 
May 1997, the seventh such elections held in Iran since 1979, followed up by an 
ever greater success in the eighth presidential election of 2001. His first victory 
marked the second phase of reform in the Islamic Republic. Despite a great 
media campaign and senior clerical support from the Faqih (Khamenei) 
downwards for the conservative candidate, Iran’s youthful electorate, female 
voters and the majority of town dwellers turned their back on the conservatives 
and their champion, Speaker of Majlis since May 1992 and a former cabinet 
minister, Hojjatoleslam Nateq-Nouri. The profound rejection of the 
conservatives is reflected in the 1997 election result itself: with some 20 million 
votes, Khatami secured 69 per cent of the almost 30 million votes cast in the 
election, compared with Nateq-Nouri’s figure of just 26 per cent. There were 
very few strongholds for the conservatives to be identified.
Khatami and his allies have become known as the ‘2nd Khordad 
movement’ (the date of the election in the Persian calendar) and are 
characterised by their advocacy of pluralism and growth, and development of 





























































































rainbow coalition -  which includes the old Islamic leftist-populist forces edged 
out of the public arena by Rafsanjani in the early and mid-1990s, modernists, 
technocrats and Islamic liberals -  have spoken of the need to introduce large- 
scale political and economic reforms and the empowerment of the citizen. 
Detailed policy initiatives included the call for more personal freedoms, social 
justice, privacy, tolerance, public participation in the affairs of state, 
consolidation of the rule of law, an open and free press, establishment of 
political parties, transparency in government, accountability and an end to 
corruption. This was a breath-taking agenda for any polity, not least for one still 
gripped by ideology and dogma.9
The 2nd Khordad movement consolidated its May 1997 gains with 
victories in the February 1999 municipal elections and the February 2000 
elections for the Sixth Majlis. In the Majlis elections, the pro-Khatami list won 
over 60 per cent of the seats. The 2nd Khordad coalition candidates, representing 
some 20 parties, organisations and groups, took almost all of Tehran’s 30 seats 
and majority of seats in a host of other towns and cities.
It is not surprising, then, that as the Khatami team got entrenched so the 
conservatives were galvanised into action. They forced the departure of several 
leading reformers and Khatami advisors from the political scene (including 
Nouri and Mohajerani), the imprisonment of a number of the key figures in his 
camp, and the suspension of over a dozen pro-Khatami newspapers. While a 
conservative backlash was regarded as more or less inevitable by observers, the 
extent of their fightback, and their methods, continued to cause concern. As 
Iran’s political system is based on the smooth working of a number of 
competing institutions -  the Majlis, the presidency, the ministries, the judiciary, 
the Expediency Council, the Guardian Council and finally the Faqih’s office -  it 
was feared that the continuing in-fighting would result in a general breakdown, 
destabilising the entire government machinery and creating fertile conditions for 
the direct involvement of the anti-reform factions and of the military in the 
political process. There was also some concern that the struggle for power 
would mortally weaken the reformist camp, increase the prospects for more 
violent encounters between the various factions, and between pro-Khatami 
students and the security forces, and end in the collapse of the reformist front.
See Ali Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics o f Managing Change 
(London: RIIA, 2000); Ehteshami, ‘Iran’s new Order’; and reporting by RFE/RL Iran 





























































































To add fuel to these fires, the highly factionalised environment that the 
Iranian power elite now finds itself in10 is sapping away the country’s creative 
energies, compounding the potential political crisis facing President Khatami. In 
this highly charged situation, the in-built system of checks and balances could 
do more harm than good to the workings of the system and the defence of the 
country’s interests overseas. The reforms have not just challenged the 
conservatives’ grip on power, but, more fundamentally, have put to the test the 
very flexibility and adaptability of Iran’s post-revolution political system. In the 
process, they have raised questions about Iran’s place in the wider world.
2.2. The nature of Iranian foreign policy
Nonetheless, the changes inside Iran in 1997 soon translated into new foreign 
policy initiatives by the presidency. Again, while continuing with the pragmatist 
foreign policy line set out by his predecessor, Khatami’s first forays onto the 
international arena were to seal the new tone from Tehran. Within six months of 
taking office, he had hosted the summit of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) in Tehran, which effectively ended Iran’s regional and 
international isolation, and went a long way towards repairing its relations with 
the Arab world. Khatami used this important summit to make new friends, and 
also spell out his domestic and foreign policy agendas to the largest gathering of 
Muslim leaders in recent times. His successes at this summit were soon 
followed by his remarkable interview with CNN in January 1998, in which he 
spoke of the dialogue of civilisations, ‘an intellectual affinity with the essence 
of the American civilisation’, and his admiration for the successful mixture of 
religion and liberty in the US.11
Khatami’s foreign policy initiatives can be viewed from the vantage point 
of the period since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Broadly speaking, three phases 
can be identified in Iran’s international behaviour from 1988. Each phase is 
indicative of the changing priorities of the regime at home, reactions to internal 
developments and, to a lesser degree, of the balance of forces within the Iranian 
political elite. By the late 1980s military and political developments in the
10 For a recent examination, see Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure o f Power in 
the Islamic Republic (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000).
11 For discussion of Khatami’s foreign policy moves towards the West, see Gary Sick, ‘The 
Future of US-Iran Relations’, Global Dialogue, Voi. 3, No. 2-3, Spring/Summer 2001, pp. 
63-71; also Daniel Byman et al., Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era 




























































































region had forced a reassessment of the rejectionist strategy of the republic. The 
appointment of the then-Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani as the Commander-in-Chief 
of the armed forces illustrated the ascendance of the pragmatists in power and 
Iran’s unconditional acceptance of SCR 598 owed much to his appointment as 
the C-in-C and his wish to end the war before a complete collapse of the Iranian 
war effort. This phase in Iran’s foreign relations can be termed the ‘re­
orientation phase’.12 The immediate post-war period was characterised by the 
transition from radicalism to accommodation. This period started in earnest in 
June 1988 and lasted until August 1990, by which time one can identify the end 
of the transition to pragmatism and the establishment of the ‘pragmatist line’ in 
Iran’s foreign policy, the second phase.
The third phase in Iran’s post-war foreign policy emerged with the rise of 
the 2nd Khordad movement. Khatami’s foreign policy reinforced the non- 
ideological aspects of Rafsanjani’s foreign policy, but it also went further, 
preaching compromise, rule of law and moderation. This phase in Iran’s foreign 
policy can suitably be termed the drive for moderation -  ‘détente’. It is 
symbolised by Khatami’s overtly moderate and non-confrontational approach to 
foreign policy, the president’s declared aim of establishing a ‘dialogue of 
civilisations’, and attempts at reaching an ‘understanding’ with the West 
(including the United States). During his first term in office he made scores of 
overseas trips and visited over a dozen countries, higher than any other Iranian 
leader since the revolution.13
2.3. Iran’s role in the Gulf
The main determinants of Iran’s regional foreign policy may be summarised 
under the following six points:
• ‘Islam’ or its interpretation remains a factor, albeit more as a domestic 
constraint on what the government can do, and as a motivation for some 
factions and non-official actors.
12 See Anoushiravan Ehteshami & Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: middle powers in 
a penetrated regional system (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 43-46.
13 For a review of Iran’s relations with Western Europe to 1998, see Adam Tarock, ‘Iran- 
Western Europe Relations on the Mend’, in British Journal o f Middle Eastern Studies, 




























































































• There remain divisions within the system which mean policy is not always 
consistent. This may be exacerbated by actions or policies pursued by non­
governmental actors.
• The anti-’imperial’, nationalist theme remains strong: hence, among other 
things, the desire to see a drastic reduction of the US role in the Gulf.
• Iran -  under any regime -  will continue to see itself as by rights the 
dominant actor in the Gulf, and at the very least as playing a major role in 
Gulf-wide matters.
• Security remains a major concern -  hence two apparently paradoxical 
features: on the one hand an effort at strengthening its defensive capabilities, 
given its long coastline and other regional threats; on the other a concerted 
effort at maintaining the status quo, to avoid destabilisation of the region.
• Economic regeneration also remains a crucially important aim, which is in 
part pursued through foreign policy; good relations with the West, an appeal 
to expatriate Iranians, and good relations with the GCC states are all part of 
this strategy.
Clearly, Iran’s charm offensive towards the GCC strategy, intermittently 
pursued from the mid-1980s, and especially from August 1988, did bear fruit.14 
Relations with Saudi Arabia were the last to improve, but a good measure of 
success has crowned Iran’s courting of Saudi Arabia since 1996. The two 
countries’ defence ministers have since met more than once and Iranian naval 
vessels have visited the Saudi Red Sea port of Jeddah, arguably the Kingdom’s 
most strategic maritime facility. They remain still a distance away from being 
close allies. Tehran still regards Saudi Arabia as an ideological rival, in Central 
Asia and elsewhere in West Asia, as well as a close ally of the United States 
(whereas Iran wants to see the local role of the US drastically reduced). Riyadh 
in turn is conscious of the latent threat Iran poses to its interests in the Gulf and 
beyond, but is now keen to develop the friendship with the pragmatic Iranian 
leadership and carve for itself the role of a mediator in Iran’s dialogue with the 
West and neighbouring countries.15
14 For an account of the development of Iranian-GCC relations 1980-1990, see Gerd 
Nonneman, ‘The GCC and the Islamic Republic’: towards a restoration of the pattern’, in 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami & Manshour Varasteh (ed.), Iran and the International 
Community (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 102-123.
15 Confidential interviews and conversations by Nonneman & Ehteshami with officials and 




























































































With its other large Arab neighbour, Iraq, Tehran has maintained 
reasonable relations, fairly high-level exchanges at the diplomatic level, and 
mutually advantageous economic contacts, but little more. Indeed, periodic 
tensions over opposition groups hosted across each others’ borders, over alleged 
incursions, and over the Iraqi planes still in Iran since the second Gulf War, 
continue to flare up. Iran will continue to see Iraq as a potential future threat 
both to itself and to its interests in the Gulf.
The only other area of concern is the continuing territorial dispute 
between Iran and the UAE, which has the potential to flare up into a wider inter­
state conflict although it is more likely to be contained.16
3. Iraq -  long-term issues
The two key Iraqi medium-to-long-term issues that need addressing if long-term 
security is to have any chance of being achieved, are redevelopment and 
security of access to the sea. An utterly destroyed and impoverished Iraq can 
only be a breeding ground for further radicalism and instability. The 
importance of this aim cannot be overstated. The same is true for the country’s 
access to world shipping lanes. Every single regime since independence has felt 
compelled to dispute the present configuration, whether with Iran over the Shatt 
al-Arab, or with Kuwait over Warba, Bubiyan and the Khor al-Abdallah. Unless 
a solution is found that is genuinely acceptable to all parties, the problem is 
bound to rear its head again. The 1992 and 1993 UN Iran-Iraq Boundary 
Demarcation Commission’s rulings, subsequently adopted by a UN Security 
Council resolution, which set the land border in stone and imposed a maritime 
boundary that left Iraq’s main navigation channel within Kuwaiti waters, is 
therefore likely to prove a recipe for future difficulties, unless ameliorated by 
imaginative interpretations and arrangements.17
16 See Richard Schofield, ‘Down to the Usual Suspects: Border and Territorial Disputes in 
the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf at the Millennium’, in Joseph Kechichian (ed.), 
Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf States (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 213-236.
17 For further elaboration see Richard Schofield, ‘The Kuwaiti Islands of Warbah and 
Bubiyan, and Iraqi access to the sea’, in Schofield (ed.), Territorial Foundations o f the 
Gulf States (London: UCL Press, 1994), pp. 153-175; and Gerd Nonneman, ‘The 
(Geo)Political Economy of Iraqi-Kuwaiti Relations’, in Geopolitics & International 




























































































This is all the more so because Iraq’s perceived need for secure access to 
the sea is intertwined with long-standing nationalist reflexes, dating back to the 
creation of the state and subsequent boundary definition by Britain. This 
extends well beyond any ruling group and is deeply embedded among the Iraqi 
population. They may not all feel deeply Iraqi (as compared to ethnic and 
regional or tribal identities), but even in the early stages of state formation one 
of the uniting factors was resentment of foreign domination. This is also in 
evidence today -  even as distaste for Saddam’s regime remains. Long-term 
security arrangements in the Gulf will therefore need to take account of this 
Iraqi reflex.
In the above, one long-term problematic factor has already been touched 
upon: the nature of the Iraqi state. Regardless of what regime is in power, this 
state remains insecure in a variety of ways -  which have usually translated into 
authoritarian rule and foreign assertiveness. The insecurity stems as much from 
the shallowness of ‘Iraqi’ identity, as from the objective geostrategic insecurity 
already referred to.18 These intertwining insecurities will remain a factor to 
reckon with, and will continue to influence the nature of politics and regimes in 
the country. Yet that should not be misinterpreted as meaning that Iraq can only 
ever be ruled by military or otherwise authoritarian regimes, nor that the 
various groups in the country would take the first available opportunity to claim 
independence (in the case of the Kurds) or join Iran (in the case of the southern 
Shia): neither Kurds nor Shia have seriously pursued that option. Kurdish 
leaders have long recognised that genuine autonomy within Iraq would fulfil 
their key requirements while also being acceptable to their necessary foreign 
backers. Iraq’s Shia are sufficiently different ethnically and culturally from their 
fellow Shias across the border,19 to make far-reaching identification with Iran 
very unlikely. It is worth noting that they provided the bulk of the Iraqi fighting 
forces in the war against Iran.
4. Iraq under Saddam Hussein
4.1. The nature o f the Iraqi regime
The nature of the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein must be understood as 
flowing from a combination of the more general, long-term characteristics of
18 See Charles Tripp, A Modem History o f Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001).




























































































the Iraqi state described above, and particular features of the current regime 
itself. The latter, indeed, to some extent flow from the former. The basic 
insecurity of the Iraqi state -  both qua state and in terms of its geo-strategic 
dilemmas -  in part explains and reinforces the insecurity of the regime. 
Aggressive protection of internal cohesion and against external challenges has 
often taken the shape of authoritarian rule, and of domestic and external 
violence. This is the epitome of the ‘fierce state’, as Ayubi has termed it: a 
state that exhibits aggressive behaviour domestically and possibly externally not 
because of its strength but precisely because of its insecurity. Saddam has 
constructed a regime that reflects these basic characteristics, and moulded it in 
his own particular way.20 1 His power rests on the military, the overlapping 
security services, his kin and others from his home region of Takrit, and a 
strongly developed party apparatus that duplicates and/or controls many formal 
state organs. Ruthless elimination of potential rivals and opponents -  
implicating others in the system in such purges -  was combined with the 
legitimising use of development policy (quite successful until 1982) and of 
nationalist and, increasingly, Islamic symbols. Since 1979, the party has, of 
course, become subservient to Saddam, rather than retaining any independent 
ideological content. He himself and his key allies occupy all the key positions 
controlling both party and government structures, as well as the military and the 
security services.
Saddam was able to rise to this position of absolute power by effectively 
pursuing a ‘double act’ with his uncle, General Al-Hasan Al-Bakr, who, as a 
respected military officer, was Iraq’s President from 1968 to 1979. Al-Bakr, 
who had the military on side, appointed his young nephew as party organiser. 
Over the next few years, Saddam built up the party apparatus and the security 
services, and his own power with it -  while remaining in the shadows and thus 
not attracting any significant challenge. The complex system of overlapping 
organs of control was, in the end, transparent only from the vantage point of its 
builder -  who indeed took pride in the fact. Once he felt sufficiently secure, he 
moved his uncle -  by then fairly ill -  aside and took the presidency himself. 
Soon after, the discovery of a plot with Syria was announced, in which the main 
potential challengers to his rule were allegedly implicated. They were accused, 
condemned and shot without delay -  again a process which was videoed and in 
which others were made fellow-executioners, thus tying them into the system.
20 Nazih Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State (London: IB Tauris, 1995).
21 See Charles Tripp, ‘Domestic Politics in Iraq: Saddam Hussein and the Autocrat’s 
Fallacy’, in Anoushiravan Ehteshami & Gerd Nonneman, War and Peace in the Gulf 




























































































In governing, however, Saddam always was careful to take the credit for 
successes, while deflecting problems and failures onto government officials. 
Equally importantly, even the hint of dissent was ruthlessly suppressed, and 
figures who acquired too much of a status in their own right, such as successful 
generals in the Iran-Iraq war, were frequently eliminated in staged accidents or 
otherwise. In the end, no-one closely associated with the regime was able or 
willing to assert themselves against it, because they had no power base other 
than their reliance on Saddam Hussein.22
The regime also in effect created a constituency in the form of a state- 
sponsored bourgeoisie, whose interests intertwine with those of members of the 
elite. Together with the development effort, this fostered active support on the 
part of a minority, and helped maintain acquiescence on the part of the majority.
The only serious challenges to this dispensation came from the Kurds, 
who waged a periodic struggle to achieve genuine autonomy; and from much of 
the southern population in the aftermath of the Iraqi defeat in Operation Desert 
Storm. The main outside challenge was, until 1988, Iran. It is this Iranian threat, 
together with the economic consequences of the reaction to it (in the Iran-Iraq 
war) that brought about the 1990-91 Gulf war, because of the way they 
interacted with Iraqi insecurities and with the underpinnings of the Iraqi regime.
Since the end of the northern and southern uprisings that followed the 
Iraqi defeat in 1991, and the subsequent 1996 rout of CIA-backed Iraqi National 
Congress (INC) bases in the north which followed Kurdish in-fighting and 
withdrawal of active US support (the Republican Guard captured Irbil), Iraqi 
opposition forces have been fractured and mostly ineffective. The two main 
Kurdish groups (Talibani’s PUK and Barzani’s KDP) remain in an uneasy 
balance, and have both had contact with the Baghdad regime; the Shia 
opposition movements, among which the largest, the Supreme Assembly for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), is based in Iran, speak almost exclusively to 
the Shia population in the south and in Baghdad. The temporary unity of the 
Iraqi National Congress opposition ‘umbrella’ did not survive those setbacks. 
To the extent that the INC also functions as an opposition party of its own, it 
lacks a solid support base within the country. By the same token, a number of 
coup plans from within the military were scotched, and the sanctions regime has
22 See Marion Farouq-Sluglett & Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958: from revolution to 
dictatorship (London: KPI, 1987). See also Amatzia Baram, Building Toward Crisis: 





























































































had the unintended effect of increasing the dependence of the population on the 
state, thus paradoxically strengthening the hold of the regime/3 Meanwhile, the 
fears of the Sunni Arab population, long the dominant group although a 
numerical minority, of the majority but disadvantaged Shia -  a fear which helps 
explain the failure of the Sunni Arab population to rise up along side the Kurds 
and Shia in 1991 -  remains. There can be little doubt that the regime, uniquely 
dependent on Saddam, would collapse if decapitated (especially if the heir 
apparent, Saddam’s second son Qusay, were also eliminated). But particularly 
under the pressure-cooker situation of economic deprivation after a decade of 
sanctions (see below), a bloody scramble for resources and power could well 
ensue pitting Shia against Sunni. Nevertheless, none of the groups is committed 
to a break-up of Iraq: the Shia want a greater share in central power, the Kurdish 
leadership a significant degree of autonomy in a federal Iraq.
4.2. The nature o f Iraqi foreign policy
Iraqi foreign policy is determined both by Iraq’s long-term characteristics and 
the nature and needs of the regime. Iraq is an insecure state with an insecure, 
dictatorial regime; for both, the nationalist reflex is a potential theme. Both also 
are faced with a number of real and perceived vulnerabilities. The regime’s one- 
man rule not only means pre-eminence of that man’s interests, but also of his 
perceptions, interpretations and decisions. Iraq’s general foreign policy output 
has comprised pursuit of the theme of Arab nationalism and of an Iraqi 
leadership role, the political/defensive lashing out against Iran in 1980, which 
led to the first Gulf war, and, of course, the invasion of Kuwait. Especially 
since the 1980s, the unifying driving forces in all of this have been the survival 
of the state, and the survival of the regime. Pragmatic collaboration with other 
powers (including the US) could serve these aims, as long as such powers were 
not seen as a threat to Iraq predominance or freedom of action in the region. At 
the time of writing, the use of nationalist and Islamist themes to get domestic 
and international Arab and Muslim support, are combined with a concerted 
effort to circumvent sanctions and have them made ineffective and, eventually, 
lifted For the future, the undoubted bitterness felt against the West (and the US 
in particular) will complicate relations for a long time to come -  even after a 
change in regime. 23
23 This latter point is underplayed in Baram, Building Toward Crisis, which otherwise 
provides a good review of the fortunes of the opposition until 1997. Compare Tim 





























































































4.3. Iraq’s role in the Gulf
The factors driving Iraqi foreign policy in the Gulf region have been five-fold:
• Saddam Hussein’s survival imperative;
• the aim of obtaining economic resources;
• the aim of a secure exit to the sea;
• a nationalist, anti-’imperial’ reflex;
• the aim of regional hegemony -  at the very least a pre-eminent role amongst 
the Arab states of the Gulf and parity with Iran.
The same factors remain present -  even if the latter has become subdued under 
the international sanctions regime and following the destruction of a significant 
part of Iraq’s military capabilities. In the future, there can be little doubt that an 
Iraq led by Saddam would wish to play the prominent role he (and many Iraqis) 
believe their size and history entitles them to. Even in a post-Saddam Iraq, Iraq 
will inevitably continue to see itself as an important regional power and will 
want recognition as such. The second, third and fourth aims will also remain 
valid.
It is perfectly possible, however, that an Iraq that, under a less insecure, 
less dictatorial leadership, would be able to establish workable and, in the long 
run, even warm relations with the GCC states -  and reasonable relations with 
Iran. Indeed, there are a range of economic and other functional interests which 
would make this an obvious aim, as indicated earlier.24
4.4. The question o f sanctions, human rights and regional impact
As has been recognised, if indirectly, in the extension and expansion of the oil- 
for-food programme, and then in the new proposed provisions on inspections 
and sanctions regime under UNSCR 1284 (1999), the established policy on Iraq 
has proved inadequate, for a number of reasons. To begin with, although the 
Iraqi military threat has been contained, this has been a containment that only 
works in the short term: continued containment is conditional on the indefinite 
continuation of the same measures. These measures in the mean time carry a 
heavy political and ethical price. First, the human damage inflicted has been
24 A detailed examination of such functional linkages and interests prior to the Kuwait crisis 
can be found in Gerd Nonneman, Iraq, the Gulf States & the War (London: Ithaca Press, 
1986). For a recent study of the same theme in Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations in particular, see id., 




























































































huge, and disproportionate by any standards. The country has effectively been 
pushed back into the pre-industrial stage, and health and education provision 
have collapsed. To take just one symptom of this, well over half a million 
children have died that in pre-1990 Iraq would not have (according to figures 
from international organisations and studies).25 Even though Saddam’s own 
spending decisions are part of the explanation, the ethical and international-legal 
problems with this are hard to overstate.26
Secondly, and in large part as a consequence, even if a regime change 
were to occur, this policy would in the mean time have engendered a deep- 
rooted bitterness against the West, both within Iraq and beyond. The fanatical 
hatred behind the attacks on New York and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 
-  quite specifically an attack on the US, and not, at least not in motivation, on 
‘Civilisation’ and ‘Democracy’ as so many leaders and commentators asserted -  
would appear to have been at least in part fuelled by the Iraqi plight -  especially 
when the latter is contrasted with the leeway given to Israel when it comes to 
the contravention of international law. Thirdly, it has proved virtually 
impossible, in these circumstances, to keep the coalition intact, and the net 
around Iraq closed. The provisions of UNSCR 1284, followed up by UNSCR 
1382 (2001), were a minimal response to this realisation. The only fruitful way 
forward would appear to be a swiff implementation (at least of those elements 
which Iraq does not control) and further evolution towards a regime where 
restrictions on, and delays to, Iraqi non-lethal imports are lifted, while keeping 
in place military controls, and aiming to re-establish some form of WMD 
monitoring. Such a policy would also have the best chance of restoring some
25 For a review of sources, figures and estimates, see Niblock, ‘Pariah States’, Part Two. 
Some US and Israeli sources have been critical of the reports on the impact of sanctions. 
The most recent and most comprehensive demolition exercise is Michael Rubin, 
‘Sanctions Against Iraq: a valid anti-American grievance?’, in MERIA Journal, Vol. 5, no. 
4 (December 2001). Central among his arguments are the assertions that most 
international data are produced in collaboration with the Iraqi authorities and therefore 
unreliable; and that the population growth figures are not compatible with the claimed 
numbers of deaths. In fact, throughout the developing world higher poverty and 
deprivation rates correlate with higher birth figures, as well as with greater mortality. And 
Iraqi government collaboration consists largely of arranging access. Other independent 
sources indicate that a majority of UN personnel in Iraq tend to regard the estimates, if 
anything, as understating the case.
26 For thorough legal commentary see United Nations Economic and Social Council, The 
Adverse Consequences o f Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment o f Human Rights: 
Working Paper Prepared by Mr. Marc Bossuyt, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, 21 June 2000; also 
Center for Economic and Social Rights, Unsanctioned Suffering: a Human Rights 




























































































cohesion in the alliance, and of avoiding strains with (and within) friendly states 
in the region.
5. The GCC states, Terrorism and Islamist Dissent
5.1. Overview
The Bin Ladin/Al-Qaida terrorism crisis of 2001 had particular implications for 
the GCC states. Several of the suspects in the attacks on the WTC and the 
Pentagon were originally from the region, and in particular from Saudi Arabia -  
along with Osama Bin Ladin himself. Concerns, even accusations, were 
expressed by Western commentators and politicians, over active Saudi support 
for Islamist terrorist groups and for the Taliban, and/or passive tolerance of 
private Saudi financial support for such groups. By the same token, however, 
the Saudi royal family was one of Osama’s main targets. And to complicate 
things further, several of the GCC states -  in particular Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Qatar and Oman -  were potentially crucial allies in any military operation in 
Afghanistan, given the military facilities based in those countries. Saudi Arabia 
was exposed to vociferous criticism especially in the US media and Congress, 
for failing to deliver the cooperation that was expected -  rousing the ire of 
Crown Prince Abdullah and other senior princes.27
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, of course, were in a special position by virtue 
of having for some time had diplomatic relations with the Taliban; also, Osama 
himself had originally been close to some members of the royal family, and had 
in effect functioned as a representative of Saudi Arabia in the Mujahidin’s 
struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. That episode was wholly 
in line with US policy. Even the take-over by the Taliban was not seen as a 
particular problem by US policy-makers. Hence, neither were the Saudi and 
UAE gestures of recognising the Taliban regime, alongside Pakistan: they could 
serve as a conduit for contact if necessary. What this situation did bring about, 
however, was the growth of an organic link between groups in Afghanistan on 
the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other, as contact, travel, and 
financial flows between them did not encounter the problems faced elsewhere. 
In addition, the porous Saudi border with Yemen, and tribal and family 
connections linking parts of both countries, meant that the Kingdom was not 
immune to the activities of radical Islamist groups in Yemen. Yemen itself (see
27 See for instance Karen De Young, ‘Saudis Seethe Over Media Reports on Anti-Terror 




























































































section II. 6 below) is characterised by patchy central government control over 
some of its very rugged terrain, and a need for the authorities to co-opt some 
Islamist groups as well as to give large leeway to key tribal figures, in order to 
pre-empt serious challenges to the system. In this context, it has become 
possible for some radical Islamist groups -  Yemeni and other -  also to establish 
a foothold in the country, as became clear with the bombing of the USS Cole in 
Aden harbour.
None of this means that Saudi Arabia, or indeed any of the other GCC 
states, have consciously supported groups known to have adopted terrorism as a 
tool -  defined as the indiscriminate use of violence or targeting of civilians in 
order to achieve political aims. The governments of Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
in particular have funded Islamic missionary activity as well as other Islamic 
charitable work. In part, this was aimed at shoring up their legitimacy on the 
domestic and wider Islamic stages. Clearly, some of the groups and individuals 
benefiting have engaged in, or given support to, militant activities involving 
violence, or channelled funding to others who did. In a few cases, this violence 
included terrorist tactics. There is no case, however, of the latter being 
condoned by the governments, nor is there any evidence that they did in fact 
know about the terrorist end-use of specific funds.
In addition, many private individuals, including royals, in these states 
have long contributed to similar causes. Such money flows -  often outside the 
formal banking system -  are extremely difficult to trace effectively. Again, 
some such moneys have found their way to groups engaged in violence, 
including at times terrorist tactics. The Al-Qaida network did indeed obtain 
some of its resources this way. Yet here too, the vast majority of donors would 
appear to have been unaware of specific funds’ end-uses of a terrorist nature.
Nevertheless, there was certainly a more general awareness, both at the 
governmental level and beyond, that some funds did end up being used for 
terrorist and related purposes; this, however, was by and large felt to be beyond 
the donor’s control. In the absence of clear and indisputable trails, the 
government was, moreover, constrained in any attempts to contain or proscribe 
private charitable funding to Islamic organisations abroad, since this would go 
directly against its self-proclaimed mission of defending and propagating Islam 
-  and thus undercut its claim to legitimacy. It should be stressed also, that aid to 
organisations such as Hamas in Palestine, would be considered perfectly 
legitimate as these are seen as movements resisting foreign occupation and 




























































































Some of the non-government support for Islamist causes is linked with 
criticism of, or opposition to, the government and its policies. It is important 
here to distinguish between criticism (the broadest category) and active 
opposition (numerically much less significant). In turn, Islamist opposition must 
by no means be equated with the adoption of violent means -  let alone terrorist 
tactics. Active support for the latter remains extremely limited. In terms of 
attitudes to radical movements based abroad, this picture is, however, 
complicated by the important but blurred distinctions (1) between legitimate 
resistance movements (even when they use arms) and unacceptable terrorists; 
and (2) between recognised aims and grievances on the one hand, and terrorist 
tactics on the other.
Throughout the GCC, criticism of, and a measure of opposition to, 
governments and their policies have long been present. At times this has taken 
Islamist forms. To varying extents problems have arisen since the 1980s in the 
traditional pillars of these regimes’ legitimacy, and this has been further 
fostered by the economic consequences of stagnating or declining oil revenues, 
and booming populations.28 Everywhere this has become linked in popular 
feeling with foreign policy, the relationship with the West and the US in 
particular, and the Palestine question. Everywhere, too, the question of 
government support for the 2001 US campaign in Afghanistan has as a result 
become highly sensitive. The presence of US forces in this context has also 
become a target for criticism. It is important, however, to distinguish between 
the different GCC states. The US presence is at once most pronounced and most 
problematic in Saudi Arabia. More generally, opposition, and in particular 
Islamist opposition, presents a strongly-varying picture. In Kuwait alone, the 
voice of opposition is included in the political game through representation in 
the National Assembly. Here too, resentment of the US is lowest, after the 
trauma of the Iraqi occupation. Yet even among the Kuwaiti population US 
policy on Iraq and Afghanistan was being increasingly criticised at the time of 
writing. In Bahrain, opposition activity, so prominent in the 1990s, was 
essentially domestic in orientation; since the liberalising reforms of the new 
Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa, since 2000, they have become constructive 
participants in national politics. The political focus in this small island state 
remains firmly on the domestic scene. Opposition activity in the UAE, Qatar 
and Oman has been very limited. It is the Saudi case, then, that merits some 
more detailed consideration.





























































































5.2. Islamist opposition in Saudi Arabia, and the question o f terrorism
In Saudi Arabia, opposition to the regime is not a new phenomenon. In the late 
1920s, radical Ikhwan opposed Abdul-Aziz when he tried to ‘tame’ them. From 
the 1950s to the 1970s, a number of secular reform or opposition movements 
challenged the rulers, but, never a particularly strong collection, most of these 
had disappeared by the 1980s. Since the mid-1970s, however, it is various kinds 
of Islamist groups that have become the most important opposition to the 
regime.29 Islamist opposition needs to be divided into two quite distinct types: 
Shia and Sunni. The two have rarely worked together -  indeed, Sunni radicals 
tend to despise the Shiites even more than ordinary Sunni Saudis do. While 
some of these groups have used violence, and while it is from some of these that 
leads can be drawn to foreign terrorist networks such as Al-Qaida, it should be 
stressed that Islamist opposition to the Al-Saud regime cannot be equated with 
support for terrorism.
5.2.1. Shia Islamist opposition
In 1975, the ‘Organisation of the Islamic Revolution’ (OIR) was set up. They 
were mainly driven by the socio-economic interests grievances of the Shia 
community in Saudi Arabia. From 1979 they received support from Iran’s 
revolutionary (Shia) regime. A separate group, ‘Hizballah al-Hejazi' (not just 
active in the Hejaz), was set up in 1987. Following a 1993 understanding 
between the OIR and the Saudi government on improvements in the Shia 
community’s status and living conditions, the OIR was disbanded, and political 
prisoners were released. A splinter group that was committed to continuing its 
struggle, emerged in 1996, however. Hizballah al-Hejazi also refused to join in 
the 1993 ‘peace process’ with the Saudi government, but nevertheless declared
29 The account which follows is based on on-going research in the GCC and London by 
Nonneman and Ehteshami, and discussion on the Gulf2000 network, in addition to the 
work of Mustafa Alani -  including his presentation to the Annual Conference of the 
British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, Oxford, July 1997; the excellent review and 
analysis by Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamist Opposition 
(Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000); Mordechai Abir, Saudi 
Arabia: government, society and the Gulf crisis (London: Routledge, 1993); Mamoun 
Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics o f Dissent (Macmillan, 1998); Gregory Gause, Oil 
Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1995); Gwenn Okruhlik, “Understanding Political Dissent 
in Saudi Arabia,”, MERIP Press Information Note 73, October 24, 2001; and P. Wilson & 




























































































they would not boycott it. The bombing of the military barracks in al-Khobar in 
June 1996, however, was possibly the work of this group.
The roots of these Shia movements are clear: they lie in the social, 
economic, and political discrimination of the Shia community in Saudi Arabia. 
While moral support and active help from non-governmental organisations and 
groups in Iran has continued, since the late 1980s official Iranian involvement 
has dwindled fast. From the 1990s there was no significant material help for 
these organisations from official Iranian sources (contrary to claims by US, 
Israeli and, until the late 1990s, Saudi government sources). Shia radicals only 
garnered significant support among the Saudi Shia community because of the 
local circumstances. On the whole, the aim of Shia opposition movements in 
Saudi Arabia has not been to overthrow the Al-Saud and the system of 
government -  let alone to engage in foreign terrorist operations. Instead, it has 
been aimed at the redress of the Shia population’s grievances.
5.2.2. Sunni Islamist opposition
Ever since the 1927-30 Ikhwan (Brethren) uprising, radical Sunni Islamist 
opposition against the regime officially espousing the same creed (erroneously 
named ‘Wahhabi’ by outsiders, after the lS^-century reformer Muhammad ibn 
Abdul-Wahhab, with whom the then leader of the Saud family struck an 
alliance), has been an intermittent feature of Saudi politics. The focus of such 
opposition, however, has widened to incorporate issues wider than the just the 
kind of Islamic purity pursued by the Ikhwan.
Probably the most shocking instance was the occupation of the Great 
Mosque in Mecca -  the holiest shrine of Islam, by a band of armed militants, 
led by Juhaiman al-Otaibi, urging the Saudi population to return to the pure 
form of Islam originally preached by Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab and 
calling for the overthrow of the Al-Saud which was accused of un-Islamic 
behaviour and policy. There was a significant level of sympathy among Saudis 
with the grievances put forward by Juhaiman, but not with the way he had 
chosen to pursue his goal: he was putting in danger the holiest shrine in Islam. 
The government obtained a fatwa from the Council of Ulama, to permit it to use 
force to evict the group from the Great Mosque.
While Islamist rumblings continued in the form of cassettes with sermons 
against the Al-Saud, nothing more serious took place until after the eruption of 
the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. While liberal critics (mainly professionals and the 
intelligentsia: the ‘new middle class’) in a February 1990 petition appealed to 
the King to allow more political participation and social liberalisation, the 




























































































by a large group of ulama followed in May of that year. Nevertheless, the desire 
for a Shura (‘consultation’) council, for a more nationalist posture, and the 
condemnation of corruption, were all shared by both memorandums. As has 
been the case ever since the creation of the Kingdom, the royal family has 
steered a course between the different demands emanating from society, but has 
felt obliged to give more leeway to conservative demands at times when the 
regime was under political pressure: claims that the Al-Saud was illegitimate as 
a ruling group (e.g. over its foreign policy, or the wealth of the family) have 
tended to be countered by taking a more ‘Islamist’ line on social issues. This 
went hand-in-hand with the fostering of a variety of Islamic charities at home 
and abroad.
The Gulf War accentuated a number of sensitive points: the inability of 
the Al-Saud to defend the holy places, and its dependence on Israel’s protector; 
the presence of hundreds of thousands of ‘infidels’ on the land that is the 
birthplace of Islam; the vast military expenditure which appeared to have been 
futile; consequently, the perceived but unfulfilled need to build up native Saudi 
military manpower instead; and the increased tension between conservative 
traditionalists, and visibly different behaviour by the foreign troops -  especially 
women -  plus the encouragement the situation gave to domestic social liberals. 
Osama bin Ladin himself had, until the victory over the Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan, been close to members of the Royal Family, in their common 
cause against the Soviet occupation. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he is 
claimed to have offered to raise an army of Arab veterans of Afghanistan to 
repulse Saddam Hussein -  whom he saw as an atheist and aggressor. The 
decision of King Fahd instead to invite foreign, and especially American, troops 
into the country instead, turned Osama into a virulent opponent of Al-Saud 
policy, and then of the Al-Saud themselves.30
It is indeed at the time of the Gulf War that several Sunni radical groups 
became more active again and began gathering more support. Contrary to the 
main Shia movements, these groups did call for the overthrow of the Al-Saud, 
whom they accused of being corrupt and un-Islamic, and of not serving the 
interests of either the country, the Arabs or Islam. Action by these radicals took 
the form of (rare) bombings affecting US personnel as well as Saudis, and anti- 
Al-Saud propaganda in cassettes, faxes and other media, usually sent from 
abroad.





























































































The main radical Sunni Islamist opposition movement is the so-called 
Al-Sahwa movement, leading members of which are Sheikh Safar al-Hawalli 
and Sheikh Salman al-Awda.31 Younger radical preachers such as these have 
challenged the legitimacy of the existing system of government and agitated 
against Westernisation and consumerism. They blame the corruption of the Al- 
Saud as the main cause of the ills of the country, and they consider the official 
ulama as aiding and abetting the mis-rule of the royal family: the religious 
leaders, they maintain, should fulfil its duty of supervising the government -  not 
simply be the government’s rubber stamp. Violence became an accepted means 
of opposition for some in this movement (which is thought to count some 200 
key activists). Along with the two Sheikhs mentioned, many supporters of the 
movement were arrested in September 1994. They remain active underground, 
however. Yet they cannot be considered ‘revolutionary’ in the sense of a 
number of other groups. One such group, known as the Islamic Change 
Movement -  Jihad Wing in the Arabian Peninsula sometimes referred to as the 
“Jihad Resistance Movement”), has the explicit aim of bringing down the House 
of Saud. They claimed the bombing of the Saudi National Guard barracks in 
Riyadh in November 1995, and that of the Al-Khobar Towers complex in 
Dhahran housing US servicemen, in 1996 (although this cannot be verified). 
Their leadership is not known, but they appear to look up to Osama Bin Ladin. 
Bin Ladin’s own movement, sometimes referred to as the Council for the 
Arabian Revolution, also aims squarely at the removal of the Al-Saud from 
power.
*
Finally, there is also the foreign-based Islamist opposition. The most 
prominent of these has been the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate 
Rights (CDLR), established in 1993 in Saudi Arabia but since 1994 based in 
London.32 This was led by Saad al-Faqih and Muhammad al-Mas’ari, until the 
movement’s split in 1996, into the CDLR, led by Dr Al-Mas’ari, and MIRA 
(Movement for Islamic Reform) under Saad al-Faqih. They acted mainly by 
publicising what they see as the misdeeds of the Saudi regime, by media 
campaigns in the West and by sending faxes into the Kingdom itself -  mixing 
some fabrication and exaggeration in among the facts. They did not, however, 
advocate any use of violence. The split, and al-Mas’ari’s bankruptcy in 1997, 
had the effect of robbing this opposition strand of most of its strength.
31 Note that the title ‘Sheikh’ in Saudi Arabia (as in Yemen) has the traditional meaning of a 
tribal leader or a religious authority, as opposed to the other GCC states where it most 
often refers to the members of the ruling families.




























































































Underlying these different kinds of Sunni Islamist opposition in Saudi 
Arabia are a number of factors. First, it is worth mentioning that a role is still 
played by lingering resentment among some of the erstwhile powerful tribes 
and families that were displaced or dominated by the Al-Saud since the 1920s. 
In the Islamist uprisings prior to the 1990s, members of such tribes were often 
prominent (the Otaiba, the Qahtan, and the Shammar, for instance). This, 
however, has not been so pronounced in the 1990s.
The second factor has been the problematic combination of demographic 
trends with economic strains and social changes, as detailed elsewhere.33 The 
burgeoning population has brought increasing pressure on the job market, and 
increasing numbers of young people, often only educated in Islamic Studies find 
themselves without the skills needed in that market. They provide fertile soil for 
radical Islamist ferment. A booming economy might have ameliorated this, but 
Saudi GDP per head of the population, which stood at $17,000 in the early 
1980s, has hovered around $7,000 since the mid-1990s -  without any prospect 
of improvement. Linked with this is also the fact that there is an increasing gap 
between the urban and bedouin population -  with the latter and their offspring 
feeling they are falling further behind.
As already indicated, the Gulf war and the sudden, massive influx of 
foreign, non-Muslim defenders with foreign, non-Muslim behaviour, whipped 
up Islamist feelings, not least over the Al-Saud’s performance in foreign and 
defence policy. The continued festering of the Palestine issue, and the extended 
pressure on the Iraqi population were tied into this, and the conflict over 
Afghanistan since October 2001 added a further layer. If everything else in the 
Kingdom had been fine, these issues would not have had the same effect 
(although they would have had some); and if it had not been for the Gulf War 
and its implications, some of the resentments over the other factors might not 
have been so sharply felt and expressed. Meanwhile, the government’s own 
policy of pre-empting or co-opting Islamist criticism by expansion of socially 
conservative rules and Islamic education, as well as support for Islamic causes 
abroad, had itself helped the pool of potential conservative Islamist personnel to 
grow.34
33 Nonneman, ‘Governance, Human Rights and the case for Political Adaptation.’
34 Gwenn Okruhlik, “Understanding Political Dissent in Saudi Arabia,”, MERIP Press 




























































































5.2.3. The effects o f Saudi Islamist opposition
The effects of these various strands of Islamist opposition have been fairly 
limited. The lot of the Shia community has, on the whole, improved as a result 
of greater government attention to their socio-economic needs. A second 
notable result has been in a number of regime initiatives aimed at the Sunni 
conservatives -  including the establishment of a Shura (consultative) Council in 
1992, a Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs in 1994, and the consolidation of 
social rules along conservative lines.
Generally, the movements garnered a significant measure of sympathy 
among the population, but limited active support. Among the majority of 
Saudis, a taste for revolution remains absent. This may be explained in two 
ways. The opposition itself lacks coherence and a clear plan; no-one, moreover, 
has put forward a credible alternative authority to that which exists. From the 
side of society two key factors need pointing out: the rentier-state characteristics 
described earlier continue to inhibit the full flowering of opposition activity; 
and there is no sense among the population at large that the State has 
encroached upon society so far that a fight-back is necessary -  contrary to the 
situation in Iran under the Shah.
Yet this does not mean that the Kingdom can blithely expect long-term 
stability. The Afghanistan crisis has whipped up more widespread and intense 
criticism than before. This has intensified the already emerging split between 
the ‘establishment’ ulama, tied to the regime and generally willing to lend their 
support, and other, often younger, ulama who no longer automatically defer to 
the former. Even some very senior ulama have been associated with the 
criticism of Al-Saud policy heard in October and November 2001.35 As 
suggested above, economic, demographic and social trends will make it 
increasingly hard to maintain the ‘social contract’ that has led people to accept 
Al-Saud rule. At home, some adjustment in the system in the medium-to-long 
term will therefore be required, if economic tensions in combination with 
resentment over foreign policy are not to lead to political upheaval.36 In foreign 
policy, since nationalist and Islamic foreign policy themes are linked to the 
regime’s pillars of legitimacy, it cannot afford to ignore popular concerns over 
the military form of the US-British reaction to the attacks of 11 September 
2001. Crown Prince Abdullah recognised this explicitly in a letter written to US 
President Bush in August 2001, which he made public in October: “Those
35 See ibid., and, for further background, Teitelbaum, Holier than Thou.




























































































governments that don’t feel the pulse of the people and respond to it will suffer 
the fate of the shah of Iran.”37
This applies also to the other GCC states, albeit less acutely. There is, 
then, a very considerable constraint on what the GCC governments, and the 
Saudi government in particular, can do both at home, to control radical Islamist 
feeling, and in their foreign policy and collaboration with the US and Britain in 
the “War against Terrorism.” The states with the greatest room for manoeuvre 
in this respect are Bahrain, where the attention is firmly on the domestic front 
and where the Emir and Crown Prince are riding a wave of popularity in the 
light of the recent reform; and Kuwait, given the fresh popular memory of being 
rescued by US forces -  although as already pointed out, here too the popular 
mood was swinging against US tactics in the final months of 2001. 
Nevertheless, the Saudi government in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 
arrested and questioned over 100 people, and blocked an array of bank 
accounts, while its intelligence services focused on possible financing trails for 
the Al-Qaida network. After all, as a top adviser to Crown Prince Abdullah 
pointed out, the Al-Saud themselves are Osama Bin Ladin’s first target. 
Purposely, however, none of this received much publicity.38
6. The case of Yemen
The most populous, economically weak and politically dynamic country on the 
Arabian peninsula has been watched carefully by the neighbouring GCC 
member states, even before the two former Yemeni republics merged into the 
Republic of Yemen in 1990. Within little more than a decade, united Yemen 
witnessed several extremes, both on the domestic and regional levels: an 
experiment of peaceful unification and démocratisation followed by a military 
confrontation between the leaderships and armies of its founder states, and the 
total alienation from the neighbouring monarchies followed by an 
unprecedented rapprochement between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. And Yemen 
remains the only state on the Arabian peninsula that is not member of the GCC.
jl The Economist, 10 November 2001, p. 24.
38 For an extensive report on statements of early November by Crown Prince Abdullah on 
Saudi TV, his senior foreign policy adviser Adel al-Jubayr in The US media, and senior 
US officials including Secretary of State Colin Powell, see Karen De Young, ‘Saudis 





























































































Multi-party parliamentary elections, referenda, direct presidential elections, 
local elections, freedom of the print media, and economic liberalisation -  these 
are formal characteristics of political development in the Republic of Yemen. 
But lack of government control, institutional weaknesses, dependence on 
foreign aid, economic hardships, widespread corruption, a high illiteracy rate 
and very high population growth determine the Yemeni reality.39 Not 
surprisingly, then, the Yemeni experience has not encouraged similar political 
developments in neighbouring countries. However, GCC governments and 
political activists have kept an eye on the Yemeni political scene.
Public enthusiasm about the unification of the Yemen Arab Republic 
(YAR, or North Yemen) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY, or South Yemen) in May 1990 was soon overshadowed by a major 
regional event: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August. As the only Arab state 
on the UN Security Council at the time, and attempting to navigate between the 
opinion of some Arab governments and most of the population on the one hand, 
and their rich Gulf neighbours and the West on the other, the Yemeni leadership 
favoured an Arab solution to the conflict, condemning the invasion but resisting 
the deployment of western troops for the liberation of Kuwait. In retaliation, the 
GCC-states cut off their aid and in effect expelled nearly a million Yemeni 
migrant workers.40
6.1. The N a tu re  o f  the Yem eni R egim e
39 The assessment in this section is based on fieldwork in Yemen, in the course of several 
research trips by Glosemeyer (1993, 1997, 2000) and Nonneman (1986, 1997, 2001), and 
further draws on the following sources: Paul Dresch, A History o f Modem Yemen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Joseph Kostiner, Yemen: The Tortuous 
Quest for Unity, 1990-1994 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996); Jamal 
al-Suwaidi (ed.), The Yemeni War o f 1994: Causes and Consequences (London: Saqi 
Books, 1995); Remy Leveau et al (eds.), Le Yémen Contemporain (Paris: Karthala, 1999); 
Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); 
Gerd Nonneman, ‘The Yemen Republic: From Unification and Liberalisation to Civil War 
and Beyond,” in H. Jawad (ed.), The Middle East in the New World Order, (London: 
Macmillan, 1997), pp. 61-96; and Iris Glosemeyer, Politische Akteure in der Republik 
Jemen: Wahlen, Parteien und Parlamente. Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 2001.
40 For an analysis of the nature of the Yemeni-Saudi labour relationship, see Gwenn 
Okruhlik & Patrick Conge, “National Autonomy, Labor Migration and Political Crisis: 





























































































The income derived from modest oil production since the late 1980s 
could not make up for the loss of development aid and workers’ remittances. 
Yet initially the democratising experiment was continued. A referendum on the 
constitution in 1991 was followed by multiparty parliamentary elections in 
1993. The latter also showed, however, that the former southern government 
party, the YSP, would not be able to hold its own against the much more 
numerous electorate of the north. At the same time it became clear that the 
northern leadership under Ali Abdullah Saleh was increasingly unwilling 
genuinely to share power with the YSP. Together with the worsening economic 
situation which affected the south disproportionately, this led to a power 
struggle, culminating in the southern leadership’s attempt to secede in 1994 (for 
which they found support among some in the GCC, notably Saudi Arabia). In 
the following 3-month internal war, Saleh’s troops decisively defeated the 
southern secessionists (to some extent relying on the help of traditionalist tribal 
interests unsympathetic to the secular YSP).41
Having eliminated its socialist southern rival, the Saleh leadership now 
set about consolidating its hold on power, in part through an alliance with the 
tribal, Islamist and commercial interests represented by the Islah party, led by 
Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, the key tribal leading figure in the country. Tying to 
raise western applause that might result in renewed financial support, the 
northern leadership re-embarked on the path of formal démocratisation with 
multi-party parliamentary elections in 1997. These were followed by Yemen’s 
first direct presidential election (1999), local elections and another 
constitutional referendum (2001). However, the major political figures and 
interests who had already run the YAR remained in place.42 Indeed, when the 
President judged in 2001 that his position was strong enough, the alliance with 
the Islah party was abandoned and the government in a telling move pushed 
through a measure to bring the large network of Islamic madrasas run by the 
Islah, into the state school system.
41 See Kostiner, Yemen; Bernard Rougier, “Yémen 1990-1994: la logique du pacte politique 
mise en échec”, in Leveau et al, Le Yémen Contemporain, pp. 101-140; al-Suwaidi, The 
Yemeni War o f 1994; Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen, pp. 54-59; and Nonneman, ‘The 
Yemen Republic”.
42 François Burgat, “Les élection présidentielles de septembre 1999 au Yémen”, in Monde 
arabe Maghreb Machrek, no. 168, avril-juin 2000, pp. 67-75; Glosemeyer, Politische 
Akteure; Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen, pp. 135-200; and Ahmed Abdul-Kareem Sait, 
A Legislature in Transition: The Parliament o f the Republic o f Yemen 1990-99 




























































































This consolidation of regime power must not be confused with total 
control, however. Tribal autonomy, especially in the north, has arguably at 
times prevented Yemen from being ruled by a despotic military regime, but by 
the same token it inhibits government control over some areas of the territory 
and some parts of the Yemeni population. Indeed, it seems clear that President 
Saleh has no intention of attempting to impose such total central control -  for 
which in any case he does not have the resources: he appears instead content to 
‘manage’ Yemeni politics by balancing various tribal and other constituencies 
through personal contact and through allowing key leading figures in such 
constituencies to pursue their own interests unimpeded, as long as this does not 
pose a direct challenge to his own position and the interests of his immediate 
entourage.43
6.2. Yemen and the GCC Security Dimension
Although it is difficult to imagine Yemen emerge as the winner in a regional 
conflict it has been regarded as a security threat to the GCC member states. The 
harsh reaction to Yemen’s stance during the second Gulf War has to be seen in 
the light of Saudi fears dating back to the 1960s when Nasserist Egypt’s 
military support for the YAR and the socialist character of the PDRY alarmed 
the monarchies of the Arabian peninsula. To prevent an Egyptian-Yemeni two­
pronged attack, Saudi Arabia influenced the domestic and foreign policy of the 
YAR by financing the Yemeni government as well as its opponents and by 
controlling Yemeni weapon purchases from the US. To contain the ideological 
challenge originating from the PDRY, Saudi Arabia strengthened the northern 
Yemeni side in its struggle against the socialist South. One of the measures 
taken against the expansion of socialist ideology was the support of Islamist 
movements especially in the border region between the two Yemeni states and 
between the YAR and Saudi Arabia from the 1970s onwards. As a by-product, 
the export of the Saudi version of Islam had its share in the emergence of a 
radical Islamist current in Yemen.
Saudi fears of a two-pronged attack were rekindled in 1989 when the 
YAR joined the Arab Cooperation Council together with Iraq, Jordan and 
Egypt. Thus, the merger of the two Yemeni states in 1990 was met with some 
wariness from the Saudi side, which was exacerbated by the Yemeni position in 
the Gulf war. Hence also the Saudi diplomatic support for the southern
43 Research and interviews by Nonneman in Yemen, April-May 2001. Compare Paul Dresch, 




























































































secessionists in 1994. However, by the end of the 1990s relations between 
Yemen and the GCC-states seemed to have lost their ambivalence. In response 
to Yemeni charm offensive, combined with President Saleh’s determination to 
forge strong links with the US (including through the provision of military 
facilities), Kuwait resumed its relations with Yemen, and after military 
confrontations in the Saudi-Yemeni border area in the late 1990s the treaty of 
Jeddah was signed defining the border in June 2000. The latter also required a 
turn-around on the part of Saudi Arabia; there can be little doubt that this was 
much facilitated by the increasing hold on power of Crown Prince Abdullah, 
whose pragmatic assessment of new realities and interests in stability appears to 
have overruled traditional Saudi concerns.44
Yet Yemen remains a potential challenge to the security of the Gulf states 
because of the low level of its economic development combined with rapid 
population growth, the likelihood of a further widening of the social and 
economic gap between Yemen and the GCC-states, and the possibility of 
political unrest in Yemen. This is exacerbated by the limited control which the 
government has over large parts of its territory and some of the population. The 
frequent kidnappings Yemenis and foreigners since the early 1990s are one 
illustration. These can usually be settled peacefully since they are for the most 
part related to resource or other disputes between tribe and government, or 
among the tribes themselves. But when, exceptionally, Islamist radicals are 
involved -  as was the case in December 1998 -  the dynamic changes 
dramatically. Indeed, the limits to the government’s control have been exploited 
by such radical organisations several times. Although the central government 
has successfully integrated the majority of Yemeni Islamists into the political 
system, a minority of militant Islamists remains outside. They have joined 
organisations like al-Jihad al-Islami or have organised in the Yemen based 
Aden-Abyan Army. Hence, they are providing a network for international 
terrorists, as became clear once again with the attack on the USS Cole in Aden 
harbour in October 2000.45
In December 2001, the Sanaa government launched an operation against 
a tribal stronghold in the Marib region, some 200 km from Sanaa, in which 12
44 On the Saudi-Yemeni border issue and its resolution see Richard Schofield: ‘Down to the 
usual suspects’.
45 A useful regularly updated set of chronologies and analyses on these issues (and other 
materials on contemporary Yemen) can be found via the Yemen ‘gateway’ maintained by 





























































































people were reported to be killed. The security forces stated the tribe had 
refused to hand over a sheikh suspected of being an Al-Qaida member (and 
whose arrest, it appears, was requested by the US). This was one illustration of 
the intensification of President Saleh’s cooperation with the US, and a further 
notching up of the pressure on actors deemed to damage the regime’s interests. 
Yet, although the government has taken measures to arrest some terrorism 
suspects and to destroy their training camps, Yemen is unlikely to become a 
‘terrorist-free-zone’ in the near future. Thus, close security co-operation 
between Yemen and the GCC-states is necessary. Under the security agreement 
between Yemen and Saudi Arabia a number of suspects has already been 
handed over to the Saudi authorities in 2001 but the porous border between the 
two countries means that smuggling of goods and arms, and the illegal passage 
of people in both directions is likely to persist.
Solving the security problems referred to by supporting much tighter 
central Yemeni government control over the country, is unlikely to be 
achievable peacefully. Pursuing it by force may be counter-productive even if 
the resources could be found, as this would upset the complex relationship 
between the Yemeni central government and the tribal leaders, thus creating 
new security problems.
Yet both security cooperation and economic development within Yemen 
are of vital importance if long-term security is to be assured. Both indicate the 
desirability of better integration between Yemen and the GCC. For 
geographical, political and economic reasons, Yemen remains in the shadow of 
its oil-rich neighbours. Yemen has tried out a broad variety of options to gain 
external support and respect and to overcome its political and geographical 
isolation: among other things, the YAR joined the short-lived Arab Cooperation 
Council in 1989, the united republic applied for membership in the GCC in 
1996 and for membership in the Commonwealth in 1996/7. The Arab 
Cooperation Council never took off, the Commonwealth application was 
withdrawn, and the GCC application is still pending. The structural differences 
between Yemen and the GCC states make a Yemeni GCC-membership 
extremely unlikely. Indeed, the very raison d ’être of the GCC was to protect its 
distinct socio-political order from the threats posed by larger states with 
different ideological, political or economic interests. Yet, for the reasons noted 
above, and to keep Yemen from looking for allies north of the Arabian 46





























































































peninsula, the GCC needs to develop an integrative strategy towards the country 
even if it cannot accept it as a member state.




























































































III. THE GCC VIEW
In the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis, the GCC began the arduous process of 
developing policy positions and options on matters of concern and interest to its 
members. But because of the very nature of the GCC, these policy options have 
had to be consensus-based and rather general in content. This does not mean, 
however, that the GCC does not have articulated positions on the key regional 
issues; nor that the GCC countries have not been able to develop their own 
perspectives on regional matters.
1. The regional long term
The GCC regimes would like to see the problems of Iraq, Iran and Palestine 
settled as the pre-condition for a better economic and political environment. 
Greater interaction in all fields with Iran (including on regional security), and a 
restoration of such interaction with a reformed Iraq, would be favoured. Such an 
evolution would also remove some of the problems associated with their close 
security ties with the US and some EU members: a reduced US profile in 
particular will be welcome -  although an ultimate assurance of Western 
protection will remain required.
2. Iran: the foreseeable future
The GCC states favour the reform process in the hope that Iran will bum up 
what remains of its revolutionary zeal. They also like the language of détente 
and co-operation. The GCC states long to see the definitive end of Iranian cross- 
border ‘revolutionary’ activities, and the reform movement championed by 
Khatami provides the clearest chance for this to happen. Already, though, there 
is an appreciation that official Iran, at least, has no interest in fomenting 
domestic trouble on the other side of the Gulf. However, the UAE is determined 
that better relations with Tehran should not occur at the expense of its off-shore 
territorial dispute.
The question of Iran’s rearmament drive and the improvements in its 
naval and anti-ship facilities remains sensitive. For one thing, the GCC states 
are concerned that they could find themselves exposed to Iran’s naval build-up. 
For another, they are acutely aware that naval friction between Iran and the US 
Fifth Fleet could very easily suck them into an unwanted conflict situation. This 




























































































Yet on balance, there is an appreciation of Iran’s own security concerns that 
underlie some of this drive. Overall, there is a greater concern to develop and 
build on a modus vivendi with Iran, leading to greater security cooperation. 
Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah has made it clear that his country will 
not be led by the United States in this regard, since he views Iran as a 
permanent neighbour, in contrast to the US.47
3. Iraq: the foreseeable future
Iraq remains an open sore as far as the GCC state are concerned. While there is 
genuine sympathy with the Iraqi people, the GCC is still committed to seeing 
the current Iraqi regime contained and Saddam Hussein’s regional ambitions 
checked. Kuwait, the direct recipient of Iraq’s wrath, has been best placed to 
articulate these concerns for the Council. However, the GCC’s Iraq policy is 
complicated by two other factors: first, that Iraq as a sovereign, Arab, state 
should not be compromised at any cost; and second, that Iran should not be 
allowed to take advantage of Iraq’s weaknesses and straighten its foothold in 
that country. Kuwait’s concerns about Iraq’s military strength and its WMD 
activities are less prominently placed on the GCC’s Iraq agenda. The GCC is 
more generally concerned about the politics of the sanctions and their long-term 
consequences for Iraq and the Gulf region, including any impact that Iraq’s 
post-sanctions policies might have on oil movements and the price of a barrel. 
Beyond Saddam, there is a strong feeling in all GCC states except Kuwait, that 
Iraq needs to be built up again, both for reasons of principle and Arab solidarity, 
and because of the major economic engine the country can be for the region. 
Even in Kuwait, such views are being increasingly aired. Indeed, some -  
including in the royal family -  have raised the possible future development of 
transport infrastructure linking Iraq and Kuwait with the wider world, and the 
need to open channels of communication.48 Nevertheless, there is also no doubt 
that some among the ruling families of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia would
47 See Hermann Eilts, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy’, in L. Carl Brown (ed.), Diplomacy in 
the Middle East: The International Relations o f Regional and Outside Powers (London: 
IB Tauris, 2001), pp. 219-144, at pp. 239-240.
48 For instance Sheikh Nasir al-Sabah Al-Sabah, in a presentation to the Conference on Iraq 





























































































welcome Western support for the controlled removal of Saddam Hussein,49 if 
they could be confident that, contrary to previous experience, such support 
would be sustained until the end, and (at least for Saudi Arabia) that they 
themselves were not directly implicated. It would be a different matter, of 
course, if a direct and credible threat by the Iraqi regime against the Kingdom 
could be established.
4. Yemen
Attitudes towards populous, poor, and politically unruly Yemen differ among 
the GCC states’ leaderships. The bitterness engendered when Yemen opposed 
the military campaign against Iraq in 1990/91 has largely dissipated, but 
concerns remain. Yet the UAE has resumed the very significant aid that used to 
characterise its relations with the country from whence many trace their 
mythical ancestry; Kuwait too has resumed development assistance, reasoning 
that the Sanaa government’s charm offensive was indeed based on a genuine 
reassessment of its interests, and that the growing closeness between Sanaa and 
Washington offered reassurance; and in Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Abdullah 
pushed through a reassessment of the Kingdom’s Yemen policy which put 
greater store on future stability than on old Saudi claims and sensitivities 
(although the replacement of Yemen’s long-time Prime Minister Abdul-Karim 
al-Iryani, with whom relations had been frosty, helped). All were no doubt also 
influenced by US encouragement to consider Yemen’s sins expiated.
Yet a return to the level of Yemeni employment in the GCC states has not 
occurred -  nor is it a likelihood: the economic situation in the GCC along with 
those states’ own burgeoning unemployment problem, and residual concerns 
over the influence Yemeni Arabs might have among sections of the local 
population, continue to limit a full return to the status quo ante in labour market 
terms.
Yemen does continue to be seen as a source of potential difficulties for 
the range of reasons outlined in section II.6.2 above. But precisely for this 
reason, wariness is combined with an increasing willingness to engage again, 
whether through the settlement of the border (Saudi Arabia), through exploring 
greater security cooperation, or through helping to foster economic
49 See for instance the interview with Prince Turki bin Faysal in Douglas Jehl, “Saudi sees 





























































































development. Yet none of the GCC governments (and indeed probably few 
among the populations) consider GCC accession an acceptable option. Yemen 
is simply too large, too poor, and too politically different and unpredictable in 
terms of internal dynamics, to be a realistic fit with the six states of the Council. 
Apart from practical difficulties, such a move would be viewed by the ruling 
families as a threat to their interests -  interests which were after all at the heart 
of why the GCC was created. Alternatives short of membership, however, could 
well find favour.
5. The link with Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict
As will have become clear from the analysis in section II. 1 above, for the GCC 
states there continues to be both an objective and a perceived link between the 
Gulfs security and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whether it is tensions between 
Iranian policies and Israel, or general public support for the Palestinian cause, 
so long as the conflict continues and the Palestinian aspirations are not seen to 
have been addressed, the GCC leaders will find it practically impossible not to 
swim with the tide.50 Indeed, the striking contrast between the treatment of 
Israel and Iraq in terms of both states’ contravention of UNSC Resolutions and 
international law, is noted by even the most pragmatic and pro-Westem of Gulf 
leaders. Frustration and, often, anger, at the perceived double standards, and at 
the wider disregard for Arab and Muslim grievances over Palestine and 
Jerusalem, is palpable throughout these societies -  including at the highest 
level.51 Even in Kuwait, where suspicion of the Palestinians is higher since the 
second Gulf war significant portions of the population and the ruling family feel 
strongly about the symbolic issues involved.52 In the context of the al-Aqsa 
intifada, Saudi Arabia and the smaller GCC states have made it clear that they
50 Gary Sick, ‘The Ghost at the Table’ The World Today, February 1999, pp. 15-17.
51 Ibid.-, confidential interviews and informal discussions in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman 
and Qatar in the course of several visits between 1997 and 2000. Perusal of the GCC’s 
printed press over the past decade (providing a mix of the official views and more 
independent voices) provides a powerful confirmation. See also the very perceptive 
analysis of the linkage between the Palestine question and Saudi-US relations, by John 
Duke Anthony, The Impact of the Al-Aqsa Intifada on US relations with key Arab 
countries: the GCC region’, Briefing, House of Representatives, 31 July 2001, published 
by the National Council on US-Arab Relations, Washington.
52 Confidential interviews and informal exchanges in Kuwait, in several visits between 1997 





























































































stand with their Arab neighbours in condemning Israel and the unconditional 
US support for that state.
The combination, therefore, of (1) an intrinsic sense of injustice, (2) a 
political need to avoid too harsh a discord with strongly-held popular views, and 
(3) the desire to avoid being seen by other Arab regimes and populations as 
insufficiently strong on the defence of Arab and Islamic interests, means that 
the GCC regimes will continue to view the Palestine issue and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict as very important in its own right. This is made all the more acute in the 
context of having to deal with the Iraqi threat: this, after all, makes them both 
supplicants to, and targets for pressure from, the United States. The very 
involvement of Western -  and especially US -  forces in the defence of Saudi 
Arabia has been a highly problematic issue since 1990, for the legitimacy of that 
regime. Continued involvement in militaiy actions against Iraq a decade later 
are even more so -  again especially at a time when the peace process in 
Palestine has been see to die a slow death without Israel being brought to book.
Consequently, the GCC leaderships would strongly welcome the echoes 
of a louder and more resolute European voice being heard in Israel and 
Washington, as well as a more high-profile European presence in the conflict. A 
resolution of the conflict that allows the emergence of a viable Palestinian state 
with at least shared sovereignty over Arab East Jerusalem, is, indeed, of the 
essence: nothing less could ever be acceptable either to the Palestinian 
population itself or to the rest of the Arab and Muslim world. For the GCC 
states, this is not only a strongly-felt goal in its own terms, but a necessity for 
domestic and regional political reasons. Since 11 September 2001 this has, if 
anything, only become more acute. 53 By the same token, it is a key objective 
interest for the West, even if a failure to appreciate the nature of local and 
regional dynamics has in the past obscured this to some decision- and opinion- 
makers especially in the US. A more proactive European policy towards the 
attainment of those goals, therefore, would serve European as well as wider 
Western interests, while more particularly also facilitating relations, and 
dialogue, with the GCC.
53 See for instance Roula Khalaf, ‘Kingdom Faces a Tough Test of Sympathies’, FT Survey: 




























































































6. The campaign against “terrorism”
The common interest between the EU and the GCC governments is the 
containment of groups that aim at the overthrow of Gulf governments as well as 
at damaging Western interests, and are willing to use indiscriminate violence or 
attacks on civilian targets, in the Middle East or elsewhere to achieve those aims 
-  thus falling within the strict definition of “terrorist”. There is also a degree in 
commonality -  in contrast with the US -  in an appreciation of the difference 
between such groups on the one hand, and, on the other, groups that fall outside 
this strict definition -  several of which are seen by many Muslims and their 
governments as legitimate resistance movements against Israeli policies and 
occupation, against Russian policy in Chechnya, and the like. While GCC 
governments may not be supportive of the activities of some of the latter, they 
do not have the domestic room for manoeuvre to condemn them outright, nor to 
cut off funds flowing from private individuals to Islamic charities not clearly 
linked to activities falling under the strict definition of “terrorism”. Hence, for 
instance, groups funnelling money to organisations fighting Israel through 
political means or through armed resistance within the occupied territories, 
would not automatically qualify, except where they can be shown to have 
adopted a policy of attacking civilian targets.
Within those limitations, collaboration with the campaign against 
terrorism will certainly be maintained, through the monitoring of groups, 
individuals, and money flows, and intelligence cooperation. Direct 
collaboration in military activities against Afghanistan or Iraq, however, will be 
indirect at best, in the covert or low-profile provision of intelligence, logistical 
collaboration, or local facilities other than for troops. Sensitivities in this respect 
will vary between the different GCC states, being lowest in Kuwait and highest 
in Saudi Arabia, where the Al-Saud regime with its Islamic claim to legitimacy, 
and as protector of the two Holy Places, will continue to be in the spotlight.
The room for manoeuvre the GCC governments have in this respect can 
become wider only once significant progress is shown to be made on the Arab- 
Israeli issue, and provided other pillars of legitimacy are not undermined.





























































































IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN POLICY PO SIT IO N S^ >* 
THE EU-GCC DIALOGUE « 3 ^ ^ °
1. General
EU/European governments must be prepared to address security and 
international affairs in their dialogue with the GCC -  and in particular Gulf 
security and Palestine. These remain of central importance regardless of, and 
beyond, the need for collaboration in the 2001 campaign against terrorism, but 
are reinforced by their direct linkage to it. European governments must 
therefore attempt to agree on a common position on these issues, based on a 
perception of common interests with the GCC states. There will always remain 
nuances between the interests and views of individual European governments, 
so a minimal common platform should be combined with appropriate additional 
accents in bilateral approaches. It is crucial, though, that those individual 
‘accents’ are at least coordinated. The realisation underlying all of this is that 
Gulf security -  a key interest of the EU -  is one of the GCC governments’ top 
concerns, and that there is a inescapable link between this and the Arab-Israeli 
theatre. Fruitful collaboration on the issue of terrorism will need to be sensitive 
both to the domestic limitations these governments are constrained by, and to 
the roots of those limitations.
2. Terrorism
When it comes to the issue of terrorism, there are differences between the EU 
and the GCC in perceptions, definitions, and in availability of tools. Yet there is 
a common interest between in the containment of groups that aim at the 
overthrow of Gulf governments as well as at damaging Western interests, 
especially when such groups can be defined as “terrorist” by their adoption of 
indiscriminate violence or attacks on civilian targets as a policy tool to achieve 
those aims. It should be possible to include in a common campaign groups that 
demonstrably fall under that definition, while agreeing to disagree on others. 
Within those limitations, GCC governments will maintain their collaboration 
with the campaign against terrorism, through the monitoring of groups, 
individuals, and money flows, and intelligence cooperation. Collaboration in 
military activities against Afghanistan or Iraq, however, will be indirect at best.
European policy, therefore, needs to focus on sharpening the 
collaboration in those areas, while at the same time fine-tuning the distinction 




























































































the strict definition given above.54 While a single formal definition of 
“terrorism” is unlikely ever to reached (whether among EU states themselves, 
between the EU and the US, or between EU and Middle Eastern actors), a 
pragmatic approach that takes account of some of these differences is 
nevertheless possible as well as necessary. This will bring with it a definitional 
and policy difference with the US and Israel, as well as, in some cases, with 
other governments around the world, including in the Middle East and the GCC 
in particular. Yet, while it will not satisfy the desire of a range of governments 
to include particular groups as targets, it is the only practical way forward that 
will deliver the broad acceptance needed to maintain a long-term coalition: the 
best (in any case variously defined) must not be the enemy of the good.
One of the most important aids in the campaign against Islamist 
terrorism, however, and in maintaining and strengthening collaboration with the 
GCC states, would be to address the other subjects raised in this study: the 
various aspects of Gulf security, and the Arab-Israeli dispute.
3. Overall Gulf security
The overarching common interest is long-term Gulf security. The EU and
European governments should:
• pursue close dialogue and cooperation with the GCC states over short- to 
long-term issues in Gulf security, aiming in the long term to bring both Iraq 
and Iran into a Gulf-wide security system less reliant on a large-scale US 
presence;
• for the medium to long term, explore the idea of a standing Security and 
Confidence-building Conference for the Gulf & the Arabian Peninsula, 
devolved into subject-specific working groups (see section II.1);
54 In this sense, the US’s inclusion of Hizbullah on a list of 21 proscribed organisations, is 
particularly ill-advised: Hizbullah is essentially a local southem-Lebanese resistance and 
social movement with a large local social base and now part of mainstream Lebanese 
parliamentary politics, which has not adopted a policy of indiscriminate targeting of 
civilians. See A. R. Norton, Hizballah o f Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics. 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999). Tellingly, the crude explanation by US 
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, for President Bush’s refusal to meet Yasir 
Arafat at the UN in New York, that “You cannot help us with A1 Qaeda and hug 
Hezbollah or Hamas,” infuriated the Saudi leadership -  with foreign minister Prince Saud 
al-Faysal publicly expressing his anger. (BBC News on-line, 10 November 2001; Elaine 
Sciolino & Patrick Tyler, ‘Saudi Charges Bush with Failure to Broker Mid-East Peace’, 




























































































Set continued willingness to sell weapons systems to the GCC against the 
background of the development of an EU-wide approach to Gulf security.
4. Iraq
European interests in this respect are the following:
• finding a long-term solution to the Iraqi threat;
• avoiding popular upheaval and anti-Western bitterness in Iraq and the 
region;
• in the short term, containing the Iraqi potential to threaten its neighbours and 
others;
• exploitation of trade and business opportunities, and maintaining a presence 
in the Iraqi oil and gas market in the hope that Europe will be able to 
participate in the development of this sector in the post-sanctions era.
The first of these in turn requires finding long-term solutions to the sources of 
Iraq’s insecurity. This has political implications (including a change away from 
the present regime); strategic implications, especially as regards access to 
shipping lanes; and economic implications. As regards the latter, a rebuilt and 
wealthy Iraqi economy would clearly also be in the European interest. This 
would, moreover, feed directly into the fourth interest listed above.
It is striking that these European interests are not only compatible within the 
EU (even if there will of course be competition on the commercial front), but 
almost identical with the GCC’s own interests in these respects.
Consequently, the European efforts should be directed towards:
• initially, a further reform of the sanctions regime by streamlining the 
operation envisaged by UNSCR 1284 and 1382;
• working towards the lifting of all sanctions except controls on military or 
military-related imports; a front-end temporary, conditionally renewable 
suspension of sanctions could be made the carrot for Iraqi continued 
compliance on the following three aims:
• working towards re-establishing WMD monitoring in Iraq;
• supporting the Kurdish autonomous area and assure that in any future 
dispensation, regional autonomy is secured (within a guarantee for Iraqi 
territorial integrity);
• giving real voice to international efforts to resuscitate the Iraqi civil society 




























































































• preparing a long-term plan for the rebuilding of the Iraqi economy; this 
could include a proposal that once Iraq is reintegrated in the international 
community by fulfilling its obligations, war reparations could be wholly or 
partially waived, partial debt forgiveness could be negotiated, and special 
access to international financial instruments could be arranged. The 
precedent of Afghanistan could usefully be referred to.
The issue of Saddam Hussein remains a dilemma: it is without a doubt in the 
interests of both the EU and the GCC that he disappear from the scene, but it is 
unlikely that agreement will be found either within the EU or within the GCC 
on the best way forward. Yet the above policy recommendations would in 
theory be applicable with or without the present regime: indeed, such a policy 
would be more, not less, likely to bring change closer. Meanwhile, maintaining 
and developing contacts with Iraqi civil society at large, as well as political 
groups of all persuasions, should be high on the agenda. Some of this, of course, 
could probably be better pursued by some European governments, in 
coordination with their EU partners, rather than by the EU as such.
5. Iran
There are common European interests in:
• fostering Iran’s continued political development;
• fostering Iranian economic growth;
• helping along Iran’s integration into a Gulf security system.
These interests are, again, compatible with those of the GCC states -  although 
the latter retain some concern over Iran’s potential to threaten their interests, as 
in the case of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. Moreover, there are more general 
strategic and economic benefits which Europe and the US can derive from a 
good relationship with a rehabilitated Iran.
Consequently, the European efforts should be directed towards:
• developing the dialogue with Iran, including on regional and international 
security matters;
• persuading the US Administration to waive, and eventually to drop, the 
sanctions regime and let Iran come in from the cold;
• supporting the GCC states and Iran in efforts to integrate Iran into a common 
management of Gulf security;
• enabling Iran to play the moderating role it wishes to have in relations to the 




























































































and in the knock-on effects that this may yet have, the Iranian role can be 
especially valuable.
6. Yemen
There are common European interests in:
• improvement of the internal security situation in Yemen and the avoidance 
of the ‘failed state’ scenario; the following three interests derive their 
importance in part from this one;
• political development;
• economic development and poverty reduction in Yemen;
• greater regional integration on the Arabian peninsula.
The first and third of these are shared, moreover, with the leaderships of the
GCC, while the fourth, at least in some versions, is also in the GCC’s objective
security interest.
Consequently, the European efforts should be directed towards:
• poverty reduction, good governance, development of human resources and 
other issues that have already been addressed in the past e.g. under the EU- 
cooperation agreement of 1997;
• expansion of European efforts to support the development of the Yemeni 
economy (e.g. oil & gas sector, tourism, Aden Free Trade Zone);
• keeping European relations with the GCC and with Yemen on a comparable 
level, declaring European support for the possibility of a GCC association 
agreement with Yemen and for a Yemeni role in a regional security system.
7. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict
European interests as regards the Palestine issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict 
are, again, in close parallel to those of the GCC states (even if for the latter the 
concern about the domestic and regional threat emanating from the continued 
festering of the issue, is more immediate). A solution with long-term viability is 
a necessity for the interests of both Europe and the GCC -  not least precisely 
because the Arab-Israeli theatre cannot be separated in its effects from that of 
the Gulf.
Moreover, since the summer of 2001, the GCC states have been 




























































































involvement in, the issue, and the attempts to build an anti-terror coalition after
11 September only reinforced this imperative.
Consequently, Europe should be prepared to:
• reassert existing European positions on the Arab-Israeli dispute;
• indicate a willingness to use pressure on both Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority -  but given the stark asymmetry of the equation (Israel holding 
virtually all the cards) and Israeli policies since autumn 2000, Israel’s 
interests in its links with the EU should be given particular scrutiny;
• continue its political and financial support for the development of the 
Palestinian economy and its trading links with the EU;
• undertake a concerted and continued effort of dialogue with the US on the 
subject of Palestine, but definitively leave behind what has come to be seen 
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